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Foundations for Moral Relativism
In this new edition of Foundations for Moral Relativism, J. David Velleman shows that different communities can indeed be subject to incompatible moralities, because their local mores are rationally binding. At the same time, he explains why the mores of different communities, even when incompatible, are still variations on the same moral themes. The book thus maps out a universe of many moral worlds without, as Velleman puts it, "moral black holes”.
- Author
- J. David Velleman
- Publisher
- New York University
- Source
- LibreTexts
- License
- CC BY-NC-ND
- Language
- EN
Contents· 8 sections
- 01: Chapters
- 1.01: Introduction
- 1.02: Virtual Selves
- 1.03: Morality Here and There
- 1.04: Foundations for Moral Relativism
- 1.05: Doables
- 1.06: Sociality and Solitude
- 1.07: Life Absurd Dont Be Ridiculous