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Mind, Body, World - Foundations of Cognitive Science
Perhaps owing to the field's origins in cybernetics, as well as to the foundational assumption that cognition is information processing, cognitive science initially seemed more unified than psychology. However, as a result of differing interpretations of the foundational assumption and dramatically divergent views of the meaning of the term information processing, three separate schools emerged: classical cognitive science, connectionist cognitive science, and embodied cognitive science.
- Author
- Michael R. W. Dawson
- Publisher
- University of Alberta
- Source
- LibreTexts
- License
- CC BY-NC-ND
- Language
- EN
- Category
- Basic Sciences
Contents· 112 sections
- 01: The Cognitive Sciences- One or Many
- 1.01: Chapter Overview
- 1.02: A Fragmented Psychology
- 1.03: A Unified Cognitive Science
- 1.04: Cognitive Science or the Cognitive Sciences
- 1.05: Cognitive Science- Pre-paradigmatic
- 1.06: Plan of Action
- 02: Multiple Levels of Investigation
- 2.01: Chapter Overview
- 2.02: Machines and Minds
- 2.03: From the Laws of Thought to Binary Logic
- 2.04: From the Formal to the Physical
- 2.05: Multiple Procedures and Architectures
- 2.06: Relays and Multiple Realizations
- 2.07: Multiple Levels of Investigation and Explanation
- 2.08: Formal Accounts of Input-Output Mappings
- 2.09: Algorithms from Artifacts
- 2.10: Behaviour by Design and by Artifact
- 2.11: Architectures against Homunculi
- 2.12: Implementing Architectures
- 2.13: Levelling the Field
- 03: Elements of Classical Cognitive Science
- 3.01: Chapter Overview
- 3.02: Mind, Disembodied
- 3.03: Mechanizing the Infinite
- 3.04: Phrase Markers and Fractals
- 3.05: Behaviourism, Language, and Recursion
- 3.06: Underdetermination and Innateness
- 3.07: Physical Symbol Systems
- 3.08: Componentiality, Computability, and Cognition
- 3.09: The Intentional Stance
- 3.10: Structure and Process
- 3.11: A Classical Architecture for Cognition
- 3.12: Weak Equivalence and the Turing Test
- 3.13: Towards Strong Equivalence
- 3.14: The Impenetrable Architecture
- 3.15: Modularity of Mind
- 3.16: Reverse Engineering
- 3.17: What is Classical Cognitive Science?
- 04: Elements of Connectionist Cognitive Science
- 4.01: Chapter Overview
- 4.02: Nurture versus Nature
- 4.03: Associations
- 4.04: Nonlinear Transformations
- 4.05: The Connectionist Sandwich
- 4.06: Connectionist Computations - An Overview
- 4.07: Beyond the Terminal Meta-postulate
- 4.08: What Do Output Unit Activities Represent?
- 4.09: Connectionist Algorithms - An Overview
- 4.10: Empiricism and Internal Representations
- 4.11: Chord Classification by a Multilayer Perceptron
- 4.12: Trigger Features
- 4.13: A Parallel Distributed Production System
- 4.14: Of Coarse Codes
- 4.15: Architectural Connectionism - An Overview
- 4.16: New Powers of Old Networks
- 4.17: Connectionist Reorientation
- 4.18: Perceptrons and Jazz Progressions
- 4.19: What Is Connectionist Cognitive Science?
- 05: Elements of Embodied Cognitive Science
- 5.01: Chapter Overview
- 5.02: Abandoning Methodological Solipsism
- 5.03: Societal Computing
- 5.04: Stigmergy and Superorganisms
- 5.05: Embodiment, Situatedness, and Feedback
- 5.06: Umwelten, Affordances, and Enactive Perception
- 5.07: Horizontal Layers of Control
- 5.08: Reorientation without Representation
- 5.09: Robotic Moments in Social Environment
- 5.10: The Architecture of Mind Reading
- 5.11: Levels of Embodied Cognitive Science
- 5.12: What is Embodied Cognitive Science?
- 5.13: Mind in Action
- 5.14: The Extended Mind
- 5.15: The Roots of Forward Engineering
- 06: Classical Music and Cognitive Science
- 6.01: Chapter Overview
- 6.02: The Classical Nature of Classical Music
- 6.03: The Classical Approach to Musical Cognition
- 6.04: Musical Romanticism and Connectionism
- 6.05: The Connectionist Approach to Musical Cognition
- 6.06: The Embodied Nature of Modern Music
- 6.07: The Embodied Approach to Musical Cognition
- 6.08: Cognitive Science and Classical Music
- 07: Marks of the Classical
- 7.01: Chapter Overview
- 7.02: Symbols and Situations
- 7.03: Marks of the Classical
- 7.04: Centralized versus Decentralized Control
- 7.05: Serial versus Parallel Processing
- 7.06: Local versus Distributed Representations
- 7.07: Internal Representations
- 7.08: Explicit Rules versus Implicit Knowledge
- 7.09: The Cognitive Vocabulary
- 7.10: From Classical Marks to Hybrid Theories
- 08: Seeing and Visualizing
- 8.01: Chapter Overview
- 8.02: The Transparency of Visual Processing
- 8.03: The Poverty of Stimulus
- 8.04: Enrichment via Unconscious Inference
- 8.05: Natural Constraints
- 8.06: Vision, Cognition, and Visual Cognition
- 8.07: Indexing Objects in the World
- 8.08: Situation, Vision, and Action
- 8.09: Scaffolding the Mental Image
- 8.10: The Bounds of Cognition
- 09: Towards a Cognitive Dialectic
- 9.01: Chapter Overview
- 9.02: Towards a Cognitive Dialectic
- 9.03: Psychology Revolution and Environment
- 9.04: Lessons from Natural Computation
- 9.05: A Cognitive Synthesis